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Chapter 1: THE RATIONALE FOR SUBJECTING ILLEGAL INCOME TO 
TAXATION. 
 
(i) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM. 
 
As a result of the weakening rand, the economy has been unstable impacting negatively on 
people’s livelihoods. Desperation has caused some people to engage in criminal activities in 
order to accumulate income.
1
 The tax treatment of proceeds derived by the taxpayer is of 
concern. However, the taxman has put measures to retain all proceeds from both legal and 
illegal means which constitute normal tax and subject it to the Income Tax Act.
2
 The problem 
faced by the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (hereafter referred to as 
the Commissioner) and the courts is in identifying and applying a single approach to subject 
illegal income to the gross income definition, section 1 of Income Tax Act (hereinafter 
referred to as the gross income definition).
3
 The gross income definition provides for the 
inclusion of taxable income of total amounts in cash or otherwise received by, accrued to or 




Drawing from the gross income definition, it is apparent that only receipts and accruals are 
essential in the calculation of normal tax.
5
 For this reason, the Commissioner has a legal duty 
to collect tax and always challenge taxpayers to include either a receipt or accrual for normal 
tax purposes. The gross income definition is therefore, fundamental to the taxation of 
amounts received by taxpayers and the entire Income Tax Act.
6
 
The problem experienced with the gross income definition is that it does not provide any 
interpretation as to what constitutes a receipt or an accrual and the words ‘illegal income’ are 
absent from its wording.
7
 Of great importance and focus in this dissertation is the application 
                                                          
1
 LG Classen ‘Legality and Income Tax – Is SARS entitled to Levy Income Tax on Illegal Amounts received by 
a Taxpayer?’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 534-553. 
2
 ITC 1199 (1973) 36 SATC 16 (T), 19. 
3




 L Olivier ‘Taxing of Illegal income’ 2008 J. S. Afr. L, 814. 
6
 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Delfos 1933 AD 242, 253. 
7
 LG Classe  Legalit  a d I co e Ta  – Is SARS entitled to Levy Income Tax on Illegal Amounts received by a 
Ta pa er?  7  9 SA Merc LJ 535. 
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of the phrase ‘received by’. The courts have shed light on the problem by interpreting the 
phrase, and in Geldenhuys v CIR,
8
 the court held that the usufructuary who sold a flock of 
sheep on behalf of the holders of the bare dominium did not receive the proceeds realised 
from the sale on her own behalf and benefit, but the proceeds belonged to the bare dominium 
holders.
9
  While still on the issue of the meaning of a receipt, Schreiner JA in CIR v Genn & 
Co (Pty) Ltd
10
 provided limitation to the phrase ‘received by’, by stating that a receipt 
excludes money in the hands of a taxpayer acting in a representative capacity and borrowed 
money where there is an obligation to repay the money borrowed.
11
 Furthermore, he 
highlighted an important principle that ‘it is not every obtaining of physical control over 
money or money’s worth that constitutes a receipt for purposes of the gross income 
definition.’12 
The understanding of what constitute a receipt had been subject of debate in numerous cases 
especially insofar as it applies to the taxability of illegal income.
13
 In order to determine 
whether illegal income in the hands of the taxpayer is taxable or not, the enquiry turns on 
whether the amount is ‘received by’ for gross income purposes. This was witnessed in cases 
where the taxpayer misappropriated funds entrusted to him
14
 and where the taxpayer derives 
illegal proceeds while acting in a representative capacity
15
 and , where the taxpayer derives a 
profit from operating a scheme of selling dried milk cultures
16




The Supreme Court of Appeal in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
 18
 finally 
dealt with the issue and provided the principle that the enquiry is to determine whether or not 
the taxpayer had the intention to personally benefit from the illegal activity.
19
 However, in 
reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to clearly set out the test applicable 
                                                          
8
 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947(3) SA 256 (C); 14 SATC 419. 
9
 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947(3) SA 256 (C); 14 SATC 419, 429. 
10
 Commissioner of Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A). 
11
 Ibid, 388. 
12
 Ibid, 388. 
13
 ITC 1792 67 SATC 236; ITC 343 (1935) 8 SATC 370 (U); ITC 1624 59 SATC 373; ITC 1810 68 SATC 189; 
CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette co Ltd 1918 TPD 391; ITC 1199 (1973) 36 SATC 16 (T); Partridge v 
Mallendaine 1886 (2) TC 179; ITC 1789 67 SATC 205; ITC 1545 (1992) 54 SATC 464; MP Finance Group 
CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS (69) SATC 141. 
14
 COT v G 1981 (4) SA 167(ZA), 160. 
15
 ITC 1792 67 SATC 236, 237. 
16
 ITC 1545 (1992) 54 SATC 464, 466. 
17
 ITC 1789 (67) SATC 205; MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS (69) SATC 141. 
18
 MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS (69) SATC 141. 
19
 MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS (69) SATC 141, 145. 
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for determining the intention of the taxpayer. This may create a problem for future cases on 
the taxation of illegal income. 
 
1.1 THE PUPOSE OF THE RESEARCH. 
Firstly, this study will show that the requirement of a receipt may be used as a basis for 
including illegal income in gross income. It will determine whether or not the courts are 
justified in subjecting illegal income to taxation by considering and analysing South African 
case law. This study will also determine whether in the existing case law dealing with 
taxation of illegal income exist a suitable test which may be applicable in determining the 
outcome of all such cases. 
Secondly, the study will determine whether or not the tests of intention used by the courts in 
determining whether an amount is capital or revenue may be used to determine a receipt. 
Thirdly, it will ascertain how illegal income is taxed in both Australia and New Zealand. 
Moreover, this study will decide whether or not their method of levying illegal income may 
assist in solving and improving the taxing of illegal income in our gross income definition. 
. 
1.2 THE PROBLEM STATEMENT. 
The current approach of determining a receipt as provided in MP Finance does not 
adequately settle the problem of subjecting illegal income to taxation.  
1.3 THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 
This study will be conducted based on the content analysis of journal articles and the case 
law. A comparative study between South Africa, Australia and New Zealand will be used to 
subject illegal income to taxation. 
 
 1.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY. 
This study will be important to the existing jurisprudence on the taxation of illegal income in 
determining the best approach which the courts may use to assess whether the taxpayer has 
‘received’ illegal income in his hands for gross income purposes. It will also consider the 
4 
 
methods used in foreign countries such as Australia and New Zealand, and if there are 
valuable principles that may be borrowed from their approach. This will be beneficial in 
developing our tax jurisprudence. 
1.5 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY. 
This study is only focused on the phrase ‘received by’ as contained in our gross income 
definition. The comparative study only focuses on Australia and New Zealand and makes 
reference to cases which were not decided in those countries. The cases only become 
applicable to the extent that they were referred to by the authorities in any one of those two 
countries. The findings and recommendations are only limited to the South African 


















Chapter 2: THE APPLICATION OF A RECEIPT TO INCOME IN THE HANDS OF 
THE TAXPAYER. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION. 
In a statue, a definition section of key words is essential and assists in removing/avoiding 
ambiguities/inconsistencies as it provides direction towards the intention of the legislature. 
However, whenever a definition section is absent from a statute the intention of the 
legislature is more difficult to ascertain and may require the intervention of the courts in 
certain circumstances, for example if there is ambiguity. In relying on the courts for 
interpretation, what is present is that such interpretation does not always from the onset result 
in displaying the true intention of the legislature. This is seen by development in 
interpretation of key words of a section. This is apparent in the gross income definition
 
which 
proves to be problematic. The court’s interpretation of a receipt with respect to legal and 
illegal transactions will be considered below. 
 
2.1.1 THE APPLICATION OF A RECEIPT TO LEGAL TRANSACTIONTS. 
The question of what constitute a receipt was considered by the court in Geldenhuy v CIR
20
 
where the taxpayer, the usufructuary of a flock of sheep, after experiencing a loss of the 
livestock due to drought, the taxpayer decided to give up farming and with the consent of the 
holders of the bare dominium, sold the animals on their behalf.
21
 After realizing a 
considerable amount from the sale, a dispute ensued between the Commissioner and the 
taxpayer in relation to whether or not such amount constituted a receipt.
22
 In considering the 
interpretation of a receipt, the court considered the legal relationship between the 
usufructuary and the holders of the bare dominium.
23
 It concluded that the proceeds realized 
from the sale belonged to the holders of the bare dominium.
24
 Although the taxpayer received 
the proceeds, they were not received by her on her own behalf and for her own benefit.
25
 
Therefore such proceeds do not form part of her taxable income.
26
 By reaching such a 
                                                          
20
 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947(3) SA 256 (C); 14 SATC 419. 
21
 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947(3) SA 256 (C); 14 SATC 419, 421. 
22
 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947(3) SA 256 (C); 14 SATC 419,421- 422. 
23
 Ibid 428. 
24
 Ibid 428. 
25
 Ibid 429. 
26
 Ibid 431. 
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conclusion, the court provided a good starting point as to what constitutes a receipt under the 
gross income definition. Also, it has provided guidance as what amounts to a receipt and 
what does not. 
From this decision, it is evident that the phrase ‘received by’ relates to the portion of the 
income which the taxpayer receives for her own behalf and benefit.
27
 Moreover, the existence 
of the law which relates to usufructs played a role in determining the outcome of the case.
28
 
This is because it brought into existence a legal relationship between the bare dominium 
holders and the usufructuary, which in turn created a legal duty upon the usufructuary to 
transact as an agent. The income which flowed from the sale of the flock of the sheep flowed 
through the usufructuary as a conduit pipe into the hands of the holders of the bare 
dominium. 
This therefore means that from this decision a receipt is present where there is a personal 
benefit and the absence of an intervening law which creates a situation where money flows 
through a person as a conduit pipe from the recipient to the beneficiary. This means that a 
person will only be required to pay tax on the portion of the amount which is received for 
their own benefit. 
Elaborating further on the interpretation of a receipt, Schreiner JA in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) 
Ltd
29
 provided an example of a farmer who borrows a tractor from someone else under the 
obligation to return it to the owner.
30
 To conclude, if a taxpayer obtains a loan, the borrowed 
funds were not ‘received by’ the taxpayer for gross income purposes.31 The reason was that 
even though the tractor was ‘received by’ the farmer literally, the farmer was not entitled to 
use it any time he wished.
32
 The tractor still belonged to the original owner.
33
  The position 
was the same with the loan funds.
34
 
The meaning of the phrase ‘received by’ in respect of a ‘deposit’ amount given in exchange 
for containers, was considered in Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR
35
 where the taxpayer operated a 
                                                          
27
 Ibid 430. 
28
 Ibid 428. 
29
 Commissioner of Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A). 
30










 Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR 1947 (2) SA 976 (A); 14 SATC 293. 
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wholesale trade of supplying goods to customers in glass containers.
36
 Due to the short 
supply of glass jars caused by war, the taxpayer decided to create a scheme where customers 
were invited to return glass jars for re-use by charging a deposit on each glass jar supplied 
which was then refunded to the customer upon the return of the glass container.
37
 
In dealing with the deposits, the taxpayer banked the actual funds with its own business 
receipts and once a glass jar was returned, a refund was made out of funds held in the 
business account.
38
 On the basis of such treatment of the deposits, the Commissioner sought 
to tax the taxpayer on the deposits on the basis that they constituted a receipt.
39
 
In considering the matter, the court found that the taxpayer’s scheme did not amount to an 
ordinary deposit scheme and held that because the taxpayer did not keep the deposit in a 
separate trust fund, but merged them into the business account, the taxpayer received the 
deposit amounts for gross income purposes.
40
 
However, in C:SARS v Cape Consumers (Pty) Ltd
41
 where the taxpayer, a buy aid 
organization operating in the interest of the members (buyers), purchased goods at a 
discounted price from suppliers of which the full price of the sale was reimbursed by the 
buyers.
42
 At the end of the financial year, the taxpayer transferred into the buyers ‘reserve 
fund’ an amount comprising of the total amount of discounts obtained and investment income 
earned on behalf of the buyers.
43
 The question which the court had to decide on was whether 
the taxpayer received the amount on his own behalf or on behalf of the buyers.
44
 The court 
held that the taxpayer’s memorandum and articles of incorporation and its conduct in respect 
of the money clearly showed that the amounts was not received by the taxpayer therefore it 
was excluded from the taxpayer’s gross income. 45 
The taxpayer’s treatment of the amount by crediting the deposits into a separate account case 
is distinguishable from the taxpayer’s approach in Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR.46 The case 
                                                          
36




 Ibid 297. 
39
 Ibid 298. 
40
 Ibid 229. 
41
 Commission for SARS v Cape Consumers (Pty) Ltd 61 SATC 91. 
42




 Ibid 100. 
45
 Ibid 103. 
46
 Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR 1947 (2) SA 976 (A); 14 SATC 293. 
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clearly shows what the taxpayer in Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR
47
  should have done in order to 
escape liability.  
In CIR v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs,
48
 the court considered the tax treatment 
of proceeds derived by the taxpayer from successfully holding a horse racing meeting on 
behalf of two charities.
49
 Although there was a moral obligation on the taxpayer to hand over 
the proceeds to the two charities, the court held that such contemplation cannot defeat the fact 
that the taxpayer received the proceeds for gross income purposes.
50
 This case also confirmed 
the principle that if a taxpayer wishes to act in an agency capacity, this capacity needs be 
evident in a document, which legally binds the taxpayer to act as an agent.
51
 From this 
decision it may be concluded that a receipt is present where there are personal benefits to the 
taxpayer and in the absence of a situation where the taxpayer receives money as an agent. 
 
2.1.2 THE APPLICATION OF A RECEIPT TO ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS. 
The meaning of a receipt was further limited by the Appellate Division of the High Court of 
Zimbabwe, in COT v G
52
 when it considered the meaning of the word receive, in a section 
similar to the one appearing in our gross income definition, by concluding that it does not 
extend to an unilateral taking such as theft because a thief does not receive, but merely 
takes.
53
 In ITC 1545
54
 the court considered the position of the taxpayer who derived income 
through operating an illegal lottery of selling ‘dried milk cultures’ to the public.55 It 
concluded that even though the transaction in question was void ab intio, the taxpayer 
received the amount in question for gross income purposes.
56
 
A great development in the interpretation of a receipt came about in ITC 1789
57
 where the 
subject matter was whether the taxpayer, an operator of an illegal pyramid scheme, received 
                                                          
47
 Brookes Lemos Ltd v CIR 1947 (2) SA 976 (A); 14 SATC 293.  
48
 CIR v Witwatersrand Association of Racing Clubs 1960(3) SA 291 (A); 23 SATC 380.   
49
 Ibid 389. 
50




 COT v G 1981 (4) SA 167. 
53
 Ibid 162. 
54
 ITC 1545 54 SATC 464(C). 
55
 Ibid 466. 
56
 ITC 1545 54 SATC 464(C),467. 
57
 ITC 1789 67 SATC 205. 
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deposits made by investors.
58
 Relying on CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd
 59
 the taxpayer argued 
that ‘the contract was an illegal one ab initio and thus the condictio ob iniustam causa was 
applicable and this meant that from the first moment the money was received the recipient 
acquired no right to retain it and it thus fell to be refunded.’60Therefore, during the 
transaction ‘there was no way it could be said that there had been an actual receipt for the 
purposes of computing the gross income of the various entities.’61 
It was further contended that the money received by the recipient was similar ‘to borrowed 
money which can never be regarded as forming part of the gross income of the borrower; in 
this case the money does not form part of the taxpayer’s gross income because it was tainted 
with illegality at the very moment it was received.’62 However, the court held that the 
taxpayer, in forming the scheme, had the intention to personally benefit from the deposits of 
investors and as such the deposit amounts were received by him within the meaning provided 
in the gross income definition.
63
 
The taxpayer appealed and the appeal case was reported as MP Finance Group CC (in 
liquidation) v C:SARS
64
 and the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the High Court’s 
decision by concluding that the taxpayer had the intention to personally benefit from 
operating the scheme and the deposits formed part of the taxpayer’s gross income.65 From the  
moment the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
66
 
settled the question of interpretation of the phrase ‘received by’, the illegal income will be 
taxed as long as the taxpayer received the amount with the intention of keeping it for his/her 
own benefit. Since the meaning of interpreting a receipt has been settled, a consideration of 
how the courts applied it with regard to cases dealing with illegal income will be undertaken. 
The starting point will be to consider cases where the taxpayer’s defence succeeded while the 
second and last part will consider cases where the taxpayer’s defence was not successful and 
thus the taxpayer was found liable to pay tax on the amounts derived from illegal activities. 
 
                                                          
58
 Ibid 207. 
59
 Commissioner of Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A). 
60
 Ibid 206. 
61
 Ibid 208. 
62
 Ibid 2010. 
63
 Ibid 2012. 
64
 MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATC 141. 
65
 Ibid 145. 
66
 MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATC 141. 
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2.1.3 THE CASES WHERE THE TAXPAYER’S DEFENCE SUCCEEDED. 
 
In COT v G
67
 The taxpayer held an important government position as he was entrusted with 
dealing with money which was intended for secret operations.
68
 In the course of his 
employment, the taxpayer requested more money than was necessary for the operations as he 
saw an opportunity to increase his patrimony.
69
 As a result, he misappropriated the additional 
amounts.
70
 After it was discovered that the taxpayer had committed this offence, he was 
charged and convicted of theft and required to repay the sum of money which he had stolen 
together with a penalty.
71
 
In considering the tax assessment of the taxpayer, the Secretary for Inland Revenue included 
the misappropriated amount as a receipt in terms of section 8(1) of the Zimbabwean Income 
Tax Act.
72
 However, the taxpayer argued successfully against such inclusion at the Special 
Court on the basis that such amounts never became his and thus did not form part of his gross 
income.
73
 The Commissioner of Taxes appealed.
74
 
The issues which the court had to decide on was whether or not the stolen amount satisfied 
the meaning of a receipt as provided in section 8(1) of the Zimbabwean Income Tax Act.
75
 In 
considering its meaning, the court referred to the shorter version of the Oxford Dictionary 
which defines the word to receive as ‘To take into one’s hands, or into one’s possession 
(something held out or offered by another); to take delivery of (a thing) from another either 
for oneself or for a third party.’76 Additionally it is conceived that it does not extend to cover 
a unilateral taking such as theft which confers no right against the taker to the things taken 
and a thief takes but does not receive.’77 
                                                          
67
 COT v G 1981 (4) SA 167. 
68
















 Ibid 161, 162. 
77
 Commissioner of Taxes v G 1981 (4) SA 167, 162. 
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Elaborating further on the meaning, the court touched on the previously decided cases of 
Geldenhuys v CIR
78
 and CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd
 79
 which provided a good interpretation 
of a receipt to conclude that the stolen amount was not received by the taxpayer on his own 
behalf and for his own benefit.
80
 Because a receipt is present where there is match of 
intention between the giver of the amount and the receiver, in this case, the Government 
never intended to give the amount to the taxpayer on his own behalf and for his own benefit 





 the taxpayer was a stock broker on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, who 
was instructed to secure and buy specific shares by M and in securing the shares, through M’s 
company bought and resold shares at a profit to M.
83
 In preparing his tax return, the taxpayer 
initially included the profit realised from the sale of shares as a receipt forming part of his 
gross income.
84
 However, after realizing that he made an error, the taxpayer excluded the 
same amount on the basis that it was not beneficially received and thus did not form part of 
his gross income.
85
 After spotting the amendment, the Commissioner issued a revised 
assessment including the omitted amount.
86
 The taxpayer objected.
87
 
The issues which the court was asked to decide was whether or not the part of the amount 
realised by the taxpayer from the sale of shares to M constituted a receipt in his hands for 
normal tax.
88
 It was argued before the court that it was clear that when the taxpayer bought 
and resold shares to M, he had breached the fiduciary duty placed upon him.
89
 Also when he 
bought and resold shares at a profit he had the intention to personally benefit from the sale.
90
 
In reaching its decision the court disregarded the subjective intention of the taxpayer and held 
that the phrase ‘received by’ has various qualifications.91  Relying on CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) 
                                                          
78
 Geldenhuys v CIR 1947(3) SA 256 (C); 14 SATC 419ITC 1545 (54) SATC 464(C). 
79
 Commissioner of Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A). 
80




 ITC 1792 67 SATC 236. 
83
 Ibid 237, 238. 
84








 Ibid 237. 
89









 the court remarked that ‘it was not every obtaining of physical control over money or 
money’s worth that constituted a receipt for gross income purposes,’93 that one receives an 
amount for gross income purposes when he receives it for his own benefit.
94
 Although in the 
present case the taxpayer had the necessary intention to personally benefit from the sale of 
shares to M, the law disregards such intention because of the existence of a legally recognised 
relationship of agent and principal between the taxpayer and M (relationship regulated by the 
law of agency).
95
  As such the amount was never received by the taxpayer because at all 
material times it belonged to M.
96
 
2.1.4 THE CASES WHERE THE TAXPAYER’S DEFENCE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. 
In CIR v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd
97
 the taxpayer operated a business of selling packets 
of cigarettes.
98
 Each packet had a secret numbered coupon which entitled the purchaser to a 
chance of winning a range of prizes.
99
 The draws were held on a monthly basis and the 
taxpayer would select and advertise the lucky winning numbers.
100
 The lucky purchaser of 
the pack containing the winning number would receive the named prize.
101
 Since the start of 




In determining the taxpayer’s normal tax, the Commissioner included the excess profit duty 
on the proceeds realised by the taxpayer from operating the illegal lottery.
103
 The 
Commissioner reasoned that these proceeds were income forming part of the taxpayer’s 
taxable income and applied to court for an order preventing the taxpayer from making further 
draws as it thought that it would inconvenience its claim.
104
In considering the treatment of 
the amount in issue, the court did not touch on the interpretation of the meaning of a 
                                                          
92
 Commissioner of Revenue v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd 1955 (3) SA 293 (A). 
93
 ITC 1792 67 SATC 236, 239. 
94






 Commission for Inland Revenue v Delagoa Bay Cigarette Co Ltd 1918 TPD 391. 
98
 Ibid 392. 
99















 However, it stated that it was immaterial whether the business carried on by the 





 the taxpayer owned a stock-broking company which transacted on behalf of 
companies and in return received commission from the amount of the sale of shares.
108
 
During the course of its business the company transacted with a mining company in terms of 
which it sold shares of that company and derived a commission which it indicated in its 
books as income.
109
 At the end of the year of assessment it was discovered that the payment 
of commission by the mining company was ultra vires, as the agreement to make the 
payment had not been disclosed in the prospectus of that company as required by section 
82(1) (a) of the Companies Act.
110
A as result, the taxpayer was prepared to refund the money 
paid to it if such amount was ever demanded.
111
 
In rendering its return for normal tax, the taxpayer claimed as deduction the amount received 
as commission.
112
 The Commissioner disallowed this on the grounds that income deposited to 
a reserve fund was specially debarred from being deducted by section 12(e) of the Income 
Tax Act.
113
 The taxpayer appealed.
114
  
On appeal, the court found that the commission amount was received by the taxpayer and that 
the subsequent discovery of the illegality surrounding the payment of the commission, could 
not change its liability for taxation in the hands of the taxpayer who had previously dealt with 





 the taxpayer was involved in the buying and selling of stolen (uncut) 
diamonds
117
 and the operation of a scheme which involved the buying and selling of dried 
milk cultures termed ‘activators’ to the public (growers) who in return reproduced the dried 
seed (the crop) which they resold to the taxpayer.
118
 The life span of the scheme was short 
                                                          
105
 Ibid 392-401. 
106
 Ibid 394. 
107
 ITC 343 (1935) 8 SATC 370 (U). 
108
 Ibid headnote of the case.  
109
 Ibid.  
110
 Ibid, Section 82(1) (a) of the Companies Act of 1926. 
111




 Ibid, Section 12(e) of the Income Tax Act of 1925. 
114




 ITC 1545 54 SATC 464(C). 
117
 Ibid 466. 
118
 Ibid 473. 
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lived as the number in sales of more activators to new growers decreased: as a result it 
became impossible for the taxpayer to pay the growers for their crops.
119
 
After the collapse of the scheme, it came to the attention of the Commissioner that the 
taxpayer had derived a considerable amount of money from the operation of the illegal 
schemes.
120
 This prompted the Commissioner to include the two amounts in the taxpayer’s 
gross income on the basis that they satisfied the requirement of either a receipt or an accrual 
provided in the gross income definition.
121
 
The taxpayer objected to this assessment on the following grounds.
122
 Firstly, with regard to 
the assessment of the amount derived from the sale of uncut diamonds, it was argued that the 
taxpayer’s conduct amounted to theft and as such he had an obligation to repay back to the 
owner the stolen diamonds or their value.
123
 
Secondly, with regard to the amount derived from the sale of the dried milk cultures, it was 
argued that the operation of the scheme constituted a lottery as provided under section 2 (1) 
of the Gambling Act.
124
 As such, the taxpayer’s participation in operating the scheme which 
resulted in the disputed amount was void ad intio.
125
  Thus, the taxpayer was not entitled to 
the amounts and for that reason they should be excluded from the taxpayer’s gross income 
because they were neither ‘received by nor accrued to’ the taxpayer.126 
In considering the matter, the court, as per President Scott J, answered the taxpayer’s 
arguments in the negative by assuming, without deciding the issue, that if the dried ‘milk 
culture’ scheme did constitute a lottery in terms of s 2(1) of the Gambling Act127 the ‘sales’ in 
pursuance of which the ‘growers’ were paid for their crop were void ab initio.128Moreover, 
the amounts paid to the ‘growers’ for their ‘milk cultures’ were nevertheless amounts 
‘received by’ the taxpayer within the ordinary literal meaning of the word;129 that a prohibited 
contract that is void inter-partes has the necessary consequences.
130
 Also, the taxpayer’s 
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 the taxpayer carried on the business of a customs clearing and freight 
forwarding agent on behalf of its customers.
133
 During the 1991 year of assessment, the 
taxpayer entered into a contract with one A, where he acted as his agent and made payments 
to Portnet, the harbour authority, of wharfage fees which he was entitled to recover from 
A.
134
 It was the recovery of this amount which became the subject matter of the case, because 
it was presented in evidence that the taxpayer had recovered more money than he was entitled 
to recover from A; that is the taxpayer recovered from its client A, more money than it had 
paid to the harbour authority on the client’s behalf.135 
After having included the overcharged amounts in its statement of account as fees and 
disbursements recovered, the taxpayer sought to claim as a deduction the same amount as an 
expense incurred in the production of income under section 11 (a) of the Income Tax Act.
136
 




The issue which the court had to decide was whether or not the appellant ‘was paid the 
amounts as part of its business receipts which thus formed part of its business income.’138 
Also, ‘if it was then under an immediate legal obligation to repay the said amounts, were they 
deductible as having been incurred in the production of the income in terms of s 11(a) of the 
Income Tax Act.’139 
In conclusion, the court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation by the taxpayer to its client 
could not change the nature of the amount in its hands and as such the amount in question 
was received by the taxpayer.
140
   It further held that the taxpayer acted as a conduit in which 
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money flowed through it.
141
 As such, the money which it had to claim from A to reimburse 
other principals was never received by it.
142
  
But ‘if a dishonest attorney recovered from his or her client a sum for a witness’s fee and 
corruptly negotiated with the witness to accept a lesser sum than he or she had charged, so that 
he or she could retain the balance, it could surely not be suggested that the attorney had not 
received, in the tax sense, the overcharged amount and the same would apply to the disputed 
sum obtained by appellant in this case by overreaching its client.’143 
In ITC 1810,
144
 the taxpayer took a decision to invest a considerable amount of money with 
one A, who operated a scheme known as a pyramid scheme.
145
  Due to fear of the risks which 
are attached to these types of schemes, the two entered into a written agreement which made 
A indebted to the taxpayer, and that A was liable to pay interest in respect of amounts lent 
and advanced by the taxpayer to A.
146
 Lastly, A, as debtor should make all the payments to 
the creditor by paying back the interest and thereafter the capital.
147
 
After operating for a short period, the scheme collapsed resulting in the sequestration of A’s 
assets.
148
 As a result of the collapse of the scheme, the taxpayer instituted proceedings against 
the trustee of the scheme, seeking compensation in light of the acknowledgment of debt 
agreement entered into with A.
149
 
After learning of the taxpayer’s claim against A’s insolvent estate, the Commissioner issued 
an assessment including the interest due to the taxpayer as taxable amounts forming part of 
the taxpayer’s gross income, on the basis that it had accrued to the taxpayer.150 However, the 
taxpayer objected to such inclusion by claiming that it never had the unconditional right to 
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The court, per Jansen J, held that:
152
 
 A’s scheme was from its inception insolvent and appellant would not succeed 
in discharging the onus placed on him by s 26(1) (b) of the Insolvency 
Act.
153
 Moreover, the very nature of the pyramid scheme dictated its 
insolvency- the proceeds of the loan received by A from one investor was used 
to pay other investors and for A’s personal benefit. 
 
 Any disposition made by A in terms of an agreement in terms of which monies 
were invested in the pyramid scheme would not be a disposition for value; 
moreover, had any interest been paid by A to appellant those payments of 
interest would have been dispositions without value and such a disposition 
may be set aside by a court on application. 
 
 As was held by Conradie JA in Fourie NO and Others v Edeling NO and 
Others
154
 that a promise to reward investors with returns paid by a pyramid 
scheme was a mere nullity and any payment of a profit or interest would be a 
disposition not made for value and, consequently, appellant never had an 
unconditional right to claim interest from A. 
 
 However, the court could not come to a conclusion that it could ever have 
been the intention of the legislature to have a person taxed on income that he 
never got or, if he gets it, would lose it in terms of other legislation and that, 
accordingly, the interest claimed by appellant from the insolvent estate of A 




The determining of a receipt where the taxpayer operated a pyramid scheme was considered 
by the court in ITC 1789,
156
 where the taxpayer, through appointed representatives, operated 
a scheme commonly known as a pyramid scheme.
157
 The nature of the scheme involved 
inviting members of the public to invest a specific amount of money on the basis of a promise 
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that they would receive high returns in the form of interest.
158
 After making a deposit, the 
taxpayer would use the money in circulation within the scheme to pay an investor out of the 
deposits made by another investor.
159
 After successfully paying out the first few claims by 
investors, the fast increase in number of fresh investments made it impossible for the 
taxpayer to pay out interest on new claims.
160
  This resulted in the collapse of the scheme.
161
 
After the collapse of the scheme, the assets of the taxpayer were sequestrated and it came to 
the attention of the Commissioner that the taxpayer derived a considerable amount of money 
(a benefit) from operating the illegal scheme.
162
 This prompted the Commissioner to include 
the investors’ deposits as part of the taxpayer’s gross income on the basis that they 
constituted a receipt for gross income purposes.
163
 Upon notice of the Commissioner’s 
intention, the taxpayer objected.
164
 
The basis of the objection was that the amounts in question did not constitute a receipt 
because the contract between the parties was void ab initio because the condictio ob iniustam 
causa was in operation, which deprives the recipient of a right to retain the money on the basis 
that the money had to be refunded and thus no receipt can ever arises for gross income 
purposes.
165
 Further relying in CIR v Genn,
166
 the taxpayer argued that from the moment the 
taxpayer received the amount in question she had no right to retain it and it was under a legal 
obligation to refund it as soon as it was received and on the basis that it was in a similar 
position as someone who borrowed money and was under the obligation to repay it.
167
 In 
deciding upon the matter the court found that:
168
 
 In the present case the court was solely concerned with the concepts of ‘received’ or 
‘receipt’ in the definition of ‘gross income’ in s 1 of the Income Tax Act169 which related 
to the physical act of taking possession of the amounts paid by the investors to the various 
entities making up the taxpayer. 
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 As to the question whether the scheme’s investors knew that appellant’s enterprise was an 
illegal one, no finding could be made one way or the other and to the extent that appellant 
bore the onus of proving that the scheme investors were not in pari delicto, this onus had 
not been discharged by appellant. 
 
 Schreiner JA in CIR v Genn & Co (Pty) Ltd170was essentially concerned with borrowed 
money in that the borrowings there could not be regarded as being received as part of the 
taxpayer’s gross income notwithstanding the wide definition of this concept and the 
present case was virtually on all fours with the dicta in Genn’s171 case in this sense that 
because of the underlying illegality, there was no ‘receipt’ within the meaning of the 
definition of ‘gross income’ and the money fell to be repaid at the very moment that it 
was received. 
 
 It was necessary to look at the essential nature of the receipt before a determination could 
be made to find out  whether it ought to form part of gross income – deriving a benefit or 
indeed a potential benefit from the receipt would of course point clearly in that direction. 
 
 In the instant case money was received by Mrs B pursuant to an illicit enterprise. Her 
intention was fraudulent and designed to profit from ill-gotten gains and clearly she 
intended to benefit and by all accounts did benefit from the money received in the sense 
that commissions were appropriated therefrom. 
 
 It would be wrong to say that merely because of the inherently unlawful nature of the 
transactions and the availability of the condictio it could be contended that Mrs B derived 
no benefit and thus the receipts in question should not be regarded as forming part of 
‘gross income’.  This appears to accord with a well-recognized and fundamental principle 
of taxation law in regard to the receipt of income tainted with illegality which was lucidly 




  Accordingly, notwithstanding the illegal nature of the transactions and the 
consequences that flowed therefrom inter partes, there were ‘receipts’ within the 
meaning of the definition of ‘gross income’ and the Commissioner had correctly 
assessed them as such. 
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The taxpayer appealed against this decision and the appeal case is MP Finance Group CC (in 
liquidation) v C:SARS.
173
 The issue which the court had to decide was whether or not the 
deposits made by the investors into the pyramid scheme constituted a receipt within the gross 




The main argument advanced on behalf of the taxpayer was that once an investor made a 
deposit, such amount constituted a loan due to the investors  as such the taxpayer was under a 
legal obligation to repay back the invested amount plus interest.
175
 In support of this 
argument, the taxpayer relied on the Supreme Court of Appeal case of Fourie v Edeling.
176
  
In its decision the court held that:
177
 
 In s 1 of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 ‘gross income’ meant the total amount ‘received by 
or accrued to or in favour’ of a taxpayer during a tax year but this case was concerned with 
receipt, not accrual. 
 The inference on the facts must be that whatever intention there was at any time on the part of 
investors to enter into a contractual relationship with the entities concerned and whatever 
corresponding intention to contract there might possibly have been on the relevant entities’ 
part prior to 1 March 1999, there can no longer have been any such corresponding intention 
after that date as from that date onwards the entities run by Prinsloo made their money by 
swindling the public. 
  It followed that the amounts the entities run by Prinsloo were paid in that period were 
‘received’ within the meaning of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 and it was for appellant to 
prove the contrary and that onus was not discharged. 
  The court’s judgment in the matter of Fourie NO v Edeling178 did not assist appellant as that 
case dealt with the relationship between investor and scheme and the present case was about 
the relationship between scheme and fiscus. Moreover, even if the scheme was legally obliged 
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to repay an investor immediately on receipt, that was because of the legal principles 
applicable to the parties to an illegal contract, as between themselves. 
  An illegal contract is not without all legal consequences and it can have fiscal 
consequences, i.e. the sole question as between scheme and fiscus was to understand whether 
the amounts paid to the scheme in the tax years in issue came within the literal meaning of the 
Income Tax Act and unquestionably they did. 
 The amounts paid to the scheme were accepted by the operators of the scheme with the 
intention of retaining them for their own benefit and notwithstanding that in law they were 
immediately repayable, they constituted receipts within the meaning of the Income Tax Act. 
 
2.1.5 CONCLUSION. 
From the analysis of the cases above, it is clear that an inquiry into determining a receipt lies 
in respect of whether or not the taxpayer personally derived a benefit. In inquiring, the courts 
applied a specific type of approach depending on the facts of the case. It is in the application 
of a particular approach that the court has decided in favour or against the taxpayer. 
However, since the courts have failed to adopt a single approach, such inconsistency forces 
one to conclude that they may not be a single approach applicable to all cases of the taxation 
of illegal income. For the moment, the lower courts are bound to apply the Supreme Court of 
Appeal approach in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS.
179
    
This means that whenever a new case dealing with the taxation of illegal income is presented, 
an inquiry into whether or not the taxpayer had the intention to benefit from the illegal 
activity determines a receipt. In order to determine whether or not such inquiry is the best 
approach in determining a receipt, the courts approaches in cases prior to MP Finance Group 
CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS.
180
Will be considered in Chapter 3 in order to determine the 
gap in such approaches and MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS.
181
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Chapter 3: THE APPLICATION OF THE SA CASES TO MP FINANCE GROUP CC 
(IN LIQUIDATION) v C:SARS. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION. 
From the above analysis of case law, attention is drawn to the ways in which the courts dealt 
with the issues before them. In considering these issues the court’s approach differed from 
case to case. The reason for this, one may assume exists because of the different transactions 
which arose in each case.  The result produced from the analysis is that the court’s approach 
in determining a receipt is either through the taxpayer’s intention or a consideration of 
surrounding factors which brought about the amount. 
Since the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
182
 
considered the subjective approach to determine that the operator of a pyramid scheme 
received the deposit amounts for gross income purposes, it is proposed to apply the cases 
dealing with the taxation of illegal income discussed in Chapter 2 to determine whether or not 
there is a gap in approaches between the previously decided cases and that adopted in MP 
Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
183
and to determine whether or not the different 
approaches may be applicable to the operator of a pyramid scheme. In doing so, an 
application of cases where the taxpayer’s illegal gains escaped liability from taxation will be 
considered first, while cases where the taxpayer’s illegal gains were held to be taxable will be 
considered second and lastly a determination of the existence of the gap between these cases 
and MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
184
 will be considered. 
 
3.1.1 THE CASES WHERE THE TAXPAYER’S DEFENCE WAS SUCCESSFUL. 
In ITC 1792
185
 the court ruled on the issue of an agent who made a secrete profit where it 
disregarded the subjective intention of the taxpayer, who then upon transacting had the 
intention of benefiting from the sale of shares by fraudulently overcharging his principal.
186
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The court applied the law of agency, which in all circumstances considers all transactions and 
its fruits to belong to the principal.
187
  
From the court’s decision it is clear that the existence of a legal relationship between the 
taxpayer (stockbroker) and the principal relieved the taxpayer from being liable for normal 
tax. This is because whenever the taxpayer transacts, the law of agency recognises that he 
will be transacting on behalf of his principal.  As such, all benefits derived by the agent are 
benefits belonging to the principal. This therefore means that the taxpayer becomes a conduit 
pipe through which flows money belonging to the principal. 
If we consider this in light of Geldenhuys v CIR
188
 where the court held the phrase ‘received 
by’ meant ‘received by the taxpayer on his own behalf and for his own benefit,’189 it becomes 
clear that the first part of the Geldenhuys v CIR
190
 principle is absent, that is, the taxpayer in a 
representative capacity does not receive on his own behalf, but receives on behalf of and for 
the benefit of the principal and as such his subjective intention to personally benefit from the 
transaction becomes irrelevant. 
Considering this from another perspective one may assume that the reason why the court held 
strongly that at all material times the proceeds belonged to the principal, might have been 
because of the existence of an agent and principal relationship which required the principal to 
pay for the shares secured by the agent on his behalf and not the fraudulent conduct of the 
taxpayer towards the principal. 
The existence of an intervening law thus defeats the intention test of a receipt which was 
relied upon in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS.
191
 This is because one may 
be forced to assume that whenever there is a presence of an intervening law, the natural 
Income Tax Act
192
 rules relating to determining a receipt are relaxed and thus the court 
considers the treatment of a receipt in light of what the intervening law provides. In other 
words it considers the meaning of beneficial receipt in terms of the law regulating the party’s 
relationship. 
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In Cot v G
193
 the High Court of Zimbabwe found that there was no receipt for tax purposes in 
respect of money entrusted to a taxpayer who misappropriated it.
194
 This was because the 
court found that the interpretation of the word ‘to receive’ as provided in the shorter Oxford 
Dictionary, excludes the unilateral taking of property (this is because a thief has no right over 
the stolen property)
195
 and as such the match of intention between the giver and the receiver 




3.1.2 THE CASES WHERE THE TAXPAYER’S DEFENCE WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. 
In cases where the court found that there was a receipt in respect of illegal income derived by 
the taxpayer, its application has been through considering the intention of the taxpayer or 
surrounding factors. The reason behind this is the different means employed by the taxpayer 
to derive illegal income. 
In ITC 1545
197
 the court, in considering surrounding factors found that a void contract 
between the contracting parties did not affect the question of determining the presence of a 
receipt when interpreted in the literal sense of the word.
198
 Additionally, that the contract 
between the parties made it impossible for the taxpayer’s action to amount to a taking and 
thus the fruits flowing from such contract were ‘received by’ the taxpayer for gross income 
purposes.
199
 By concluding this way, the court answered two questions at once. Firstly, the 
court answered the question that an illegal transaction and the fruits which flows from it, 
forms part of the taxpayer’s gross income and secondly, it answered the question that the void 
contractual relationship between the taxpayer and the growers did not mean that the taxpayer 
did not derive a benefit or receive the fruits from the transaction which constitute normal tax.  
Taking a look at the court’s entire decision, one may assume that the court’s position in 
deciding upon the matter was thus: the taxpayer, in operating the scheme, was in a position 
where he was receiving amounts coming into the scheme on his behalf and that this 
constitutes a benefit in the taxpayer’s hands. From this position, it is quite clear that the 
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meaning of a receipt as held in Geldenhuys v CIR
200
 is satisfied (the amounts were received 
by the operator of the scheme on his own behalf and benefit). 
The court also found that in operating the scheme, the taxpayer’s conduct in handling the 
amounts, did not amount to theft, but a ‘receipt’ which forms part of the taxpayer’s gross 
income.  From this decision, it seems reasonable that the court was making a distinction 
between situations where the taxpayer unilaterally takes money and where the taxpayer 
beneficially receives the amount in question – the latter situation applies to the operation of a 
pyramid scheme while the former does not. 
In applying this decision to the facts of MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS,
201
 
what comes to light is that in both cases there is void contractual relationship between the 
parties. In taking the approach in ITC 1545,
202
  it means that Supreme Court of Appeal in MP 
Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
203
 was correct in finding that the deposit 
amounts were ‘received by’ taxpayer for gross income purposes, because the fruits from a 
prohibited contract are taxable. However in reaching such a decision it means that the 
Supreme Court of Appeal should not have relied on the subjective method of interpreting a 
receipt, but should have determined whether or not the taxpayer in operating the scheme 
derived a benefit for tax purposes. 
Furthermore, the question of whether or not the taxpayer knew beforehand that the illegal 
scheme it intended to operate was illegal, which the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP Finance 
Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
204
 answered to the affirmative, would not play a 
significant role in determining the outcome of the case. This is because in ITC 1545
205
 the 
court inquired about, whether or not from the position of operating the scheme, the taxpayer 
derived a benefit and not whether the taxpayer knew beforehand that the scheme she intended 
to embark on was illegal and the taxpayer’s conduct in respect of investors’ deposits would 
also not amount to theft. This reasoning satisfies the definition of a receipt under the gross 
income definition. 
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In considering the position of the taxpayer which fraudulently overcharged its customer, the 
court, in ITC 1624,
206
 considered the existence of a legally binding contract between the 
parties to conclude that the taxpayer received the amount flowing from the relationship 
(contract) for gross income purposes. By concluding in this manner, one may assume that the 
court applied what one may term an ‘accounting method approach’207 of business, this is 
because in reaching its decision it considered  that from the transaction the taxpayer derived 
something more than what was lost and from that position the additional amount constituted a 
(gain) receipt for tax purposes. 
By taking such a view, it is inarguable that the court was correct in finding that there was a 
receipt in respect of the overcharged amount. This view conforms to the decision in 
Geldenhuys v CIR,
208
that is, the taxpayer received the overcharged amount, on his own behalf 
and for his own benefit. This position seems correct because during the operation of the 
scheme the overcharged amount fell in the pockets of the taxpayer and as such constituted a 
receipt which fell into the taxpayer’s gross income. Furthermore, just like in the cases above 
it seems that the fraudulent conduct of the taxpayer did not affect the court’s approach in 
determining the presence of a receipt. 
In applying what I term an ‘accounting method approach’ to the facts in MP Finance,209 the 
Supreme Court of Appeal would have had to determine whether or not the investors’ deposits 
added a gain into the taxpayer’s pockets and from this view only an affirmative answer would 
mean that the deposits were received by the taxpayer for gross income purposes.  
A close analysis of the case indicate that by keeping the investors’ deposits to herself, such 
conduct added an advantage to the taxpayer’s pocket and as such the taxpayer would still be 
liable to pay tax on the investors’ deposits. The taxpayer’s intention beforehand to defraud 
investors would not add an advantage in making investors’ deposits taxable. This is because 
the taxpayer’s intention to fraudulently overcharge its customer in ITC 1624210 did not 
influence the outcome of the case.   
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 the intention to benefit test was adopted, where the court investigated the 
nature of the scheme to determine the essential nature of a receipt. This was done by looking 
at the intention of the taxpayer in forming the scheme and the nature of the scheme and the 
court found that in forming and operating the scheme the taxpayer had the intention to 
personally derive a benefit and as such the deposit amounts were ‘received by’ the taxpayer 
for gross income purposes. This decision was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS.
212
 It is good to note that such 
a conclusion is in line with the decision in Geldenhuys v CIR
213
and it reflects the law 
correctly. What may be arguable is the method of interpretation applied by the court to come 
to such a conclusion. The cases dealing with the interpretation of a receipt in cases where 
there is an amount that is tainted with illegality will be discussed in reference to MP Finance 
Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS. 
 
3.1.3 THE INTERPRETATION OF A RECEIPT WITH REFERENCE TO MP 
FINANCE GROUP CC (IN LIQUIDATION v C:SARS. 
The interpretation of a receipt under the Income Tax Act requires a careful approach. In CIR 
v Delfos
214
  Wessels CJ stated that:
215
 
‘I do not understand this to mean that in no case in a taxing Act are we to give to a section a 
narrower or wider meaning than its apparent meaning, for in all cases of interpretation we 
must take the whole statute into consideration and so arrive at the true intention of the 
Legislature. When, however, we are dealing with a definition which is the very basis of the 
Act,
216
 it can only be in very exceptional circumstances that we can modify the plainly 
expressed meaning of the words. 
In cases other than the basic definition of gross income the difficulty is not so great, but to 
modify the plain words of the Legislature in a crucial definition such as the one we are 
dealing with is to strike at the very heart of the statute. We are dealing with the most 
important definition in the whole statute, and it would indeed be bold to say that the 
Legislature did not mean by it exactly what it said, especially when we remember that the 
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system of taxation in our law differs much from other taxing Acts. The whole structure of the 
Act
 
is based on this definition, and we have no right to say that the Legislature did not intend 
to throw its net out as widely as the definition states.’ 
This problem and the development of the interpretation of a receipt have been considered 
above under the meaning of a receipt.
217
 This section aims to consider questions and loop 
holes which arise because of the subjective method of interpretation adopted by Supreme 
Court of Appeal in MP Finance.
218
 Although one scholar has dealt with the issue of how the 
Supreme Court of Appeal failed to provide a proper interpretation of a receipt by relying on 
the wrong test of interpretation to conclude that illegal income is taxable,
219
 the focus will be 
to determine whether or not such interpretation conforms to previously decided cases on the 
interpretation of a receipt to illegal income and to consider other available possibilities which 
the court might have considered in order to provide the interpretation of the meaning of a 
receipt which will solve the problem of inconsistency in interpretation.
220
  
The method of interpretation in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS,
221
 by 
interpreting the phrase ‘received by’ in light of the taxpayer’s subjective intention is one 
which is not a common method of interpreting a taxation statute especially with reference to 
interpreting a receipt. This is because it focused heavily on determining the subjective state of 
mind of the taxpayer rather than trying to determine the taxpayer’s actions and consequences 
in line with previous interpretations of a receipt by the courts. By going into the subjective 
state of mind of the taxpayer the Supreme Court of Appeal determined and concluded the 
amount was ‘received on own behalf and for own benefit’, as previously held by the court in 
Geldenhuys v CIR.
222
 In concluding this way it reflects the intention of the legislature, 
however previous decisions reflect that the courts interpreted the phrase ‘received by’ by 
placing much weight on the ordinary literal meaning of the phrase ‘received by’223 and 
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 One may conclude that that the Supreme Court of Appeal deviated 
from the common method of interpretation in order to tax the operator of a pyramid scheme.  
This interpretation has resulted in a questionable decision which has produced the effect that 
a receipt will be present for as long as the taxpayer subjectively intended to receive proceeds 
on her own behalf and for own benefit (Geldenhuys v CIR).
225
 This is inconsistent with the 
ordinary literal grammatical meaning of the phrase ‘received by’ as held in COT v G226 and 




 and ITC 1792
229
 
which exclude intention. However, since it is a Supreme Court of Appeal decision, it is 
precedent and binding to the lower Courts and they are obliged to apply the subjective 
method of interpretation to determine whether or not illegal proceeds derived in whatever 
manner constitute a receipt as provided for in the gross income definition. If that idea is 
accepted as reflecting the correct position without much challenge, then it would mean that 
the court has finally settled the question of the interpretation of a receipt.  
However, judging from the fact that the court failed to touch on previous decisions on the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘received by’ in relation to the taxation of illegal income, its 
silence may be indicative of the fact that the court was only focused on interpreting the 
phrase ‘received by’ in relation to the taxation of the operator of an illegal pyramid scheme 
only. Evidence from previously decided cases such as COT v G
230
 and ITC 1792
231
 however, 
indicate that there is a loophole in interpretation as the subjective method of interpretation in 
MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
 232
 fails to cater for situations where there 
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is a unilateral taking such as theft (COT v G)
233
 and where there is the presence of an 
intervening law( ITC 1792).
234
  
3.1.4 THE CONSIDERATION OF PREVEIOUSLY DECIDED CASES ON THE 
INTERPRETATTION OF A RECEIPT WHERE THE AMOUNT IS TAINTED WITH 
ILLEGALITY. 
Had the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the historical interpretation of the phrase 
‘received by’ on illegal income, it would have for example applied the test of interpretation 
set out by the High Court of Zimbabwe in COT v G.
235
 In this case the  court considered the 
meaning of the word ‘receive’ in a section similar to the gross income definition by visiting 
the shorter version of the Oxford Dictionary which interprets the word ‘receive’ to mean ‘to 
take into one’s hands, or into one’s possession (something held out or offered by another); to 
take delivery of (a thing) from another either for oneself or for a third party.’236 By taking the 
position that from such interpretation a thief receives where there is a match of intention 
between the giver and the receiver of the amount, in the sense that the giver must have the 
intention to give the amount in question and that the receiver must also be conscious that the 
giver intends to give the amount to him.
237
 
Had this test been applied by the Supreme Court of Appeal, it would have interpreted the 
meaning of a receipt by matching the intention of the investors and the taxpayer. That is, it 
should have first determined whether the investors had the intention to give the deposit 
amount to the taxpayer in order for him to receive it on his own behalf or to use it for his own 
benefit and that the taxpayer should have also intended to receive the amount in question for 
her personal benefit.  
By considering the facts of MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
238
 what we can 
infer is that had the Supreme Court of Appeal applied this test of interpretation to the facts of 
the case, the outcome may have been that the taxpayer did not receive the deposits owing to 
an absence of the matching of intention. This is because the investors never intended the 
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deposit amounts to be a receipt in his hands; that is they never intended that the taxpayer 
should personally benefit from the deposits.
239
  
The absence of this intention should have, on the basis of Cot v G,
240
 influenced the Supreme 
Court of Appeal to rule in favour of the taxpayer by excluding the deposit amounts of the 
investors from the taxpayer’s gross income. However such application would not be helpful 
since MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
241
 was not dealing with a situation 
where there was a unilateral taking such as theft. 
Another test of interpretation which the Supreme Court of Appeal should have considered 
was applied in ITC 1792
242
 where the court first had to determine the true nature of the 
business, the inherent duty/relationship of the parties and the law regulating such 
duty/relationship. Also, to interpret that the presence of intention on the part of the taxpayer 
to personally receive and benefit from the sale of the overcharged shares was insufficient to 
satisfy the meaning of a receipt. 
Although the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v 
C:SARS,
243
 did consider the true nature of the business of the taxpayer, by concluding that 
such business was illegal, and relying on the above test, it is clear that the court should have 
considered the other two tests:  it should have determined the inherent duty/relationship and 
the law which regulates the duty/relationship between the taxpayer and investors. 
By applying these two tests to the facts of the case, and considering the inherent 
duty/relationship of the parties, what we can infer from the facts of the case is that the 
taxpayer was under an obligation to receive the deposits from the investors and to 
subsequently pay out returns to investors while the investors had a duty to make deposits and 
claim a return on their invested amount. This therefore means that the taxpayer was in the 
same position as the taxpayer in ITC 1792.
244
 The only difference here is that there is an 
absence of a law which regulates the nature of the relationship between the taxpayer and the 
investors.  This is based on the findings of the Supreme Court of Appeal that the operation of 
the pyramid scheme was illegal. However, according to my own assumption, the operation of 
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the scheme was legal while the misrepresentation on the returns was illegal. Based on these 
assumptions, it would mean that the situation would be the same as that in ITC 1792.
245
 
Another method of interpretation which the Supreme Court of Appeal should have considered 
may have been to interpret the phrase ‘received by’ in light of the surrounding factors.246 This 
entails enquiring into whether or not the taxpayer’s illegal conduct results in her deriving a 
benefit,
247
 or the taxpayer’s conduct results in her deriving more than what she was entitled to 
get from the transaction.
248
 
By taking this step of interpretation the Supreme Court of Appeal will be determining 
whether or not any single interpretation applies in determining if the taxpayer has received 
the deposits for tax purposes. If such interpretation is identified and made applicable to a 
pyramid scheme, it will be preferred, since it was confirmed by the highest Court of Appeal 
and would have been applied in more than one case. 
Furthermore, the selection of the application of any previous interpretation strengthens the 
position that illegal income is taxable on the basis that the taxpayer has received the amount 
in question without focusing much on the illegal conduct of the taxpayer which brought about 
the amount in question. By adopting such a view, it is something which is meant to 
strengthen the position that illegal income should be taxable when received by the taxpayer 
and it should not be confused as trying to imply that the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP 
Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
249
 should not have touched on the issue of 
illegality, but should not have extended it in literally interpreting the meaning of a receipt in 
light of the taxpayer’s subjective intention. 
 
3.1.5 CONCLUSION. 
In considering the different approaches used by the courts to determine whether or not the 
taxpayer has received the illegal amount for gross income purposes, it is clear that each case 
adopts a slightly different approach. This may be because of the different means employed to 
derive illegal income. From the analysis of the court’s approaches, it is clear that a receipt 
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may be determined without touching on the intention of the taxpayer. Such approach(s), 
however have not been applied to the operation of a pyramid scheme. However the 
application of the approach in ITC 1545
250
 to MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v 
C:SARS
251
 shows that such approach may be used to subject income derived by the operator 
of a pyramid scheme, to taxation.  
Furthermore, the subjective intention approach used by the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP 
Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS is inadequate in cases where there is a 
unilateral taking such as theft and also where there is an agent principal relationship. This is 
due to the issue of considering the taxpayer’s intention. A consideration of the factors 















                                                          
250
 ITC 1545 (1992) 54 SATC 464. 
251
 MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS 69 SATC 141. 
34 
 
CHAPTER 4: SOUTH AFRICA’S TEST FOR DETERMING THE TAXPAYER’S 
INTENTION.  
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
From the analysis of MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS,
252
 it is clear that in 
reaching its decision the Supreme Court of Appeal was silent on the factors which it 
considered when applying the subjective test. Its failure to elaborate on what the subjective 
test implies and the factors which satisfy the test may create a problem in applying the test to 
facts which varies from MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS.
253
    
It is necessary to consider whether or not the court should in future rely on the factors of 
determining the taxpayer’s intention when enquiring whether an amount is capital or 
revenue.
254
 Before proceeding further, it is noteworthy that in considering the elements of the 
gross income definition, the court’s enquiry in determining whether or not an amount 
constitutes a receipt is separate from when it is determining whether or not the amount is 
capital or revenue in nature. Since the issue in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v 
C:SARS
 255
 revolved around determining a receipt, this indicates that the Supreme Court of 
Appeal conceived that such proceeds were revenue in nature and this reasoning was also not 
in dispute between the parties. In order to achieve this, the starting point will be to understand 
what the taxpayer’s intention is. 
 
4.1.1 WHAT IS THE TAXPAYER’S INTENTION? 
The taxpayer’s intention can be defined as his/her mental direction towards achieving a 
particular result in respect of an object.
256
 This therefore means that in achieving this, we are 
determining something subjective, but the test is partly objective.  In many cases where the 
issue of intention was central to determining the outcome of the issues before the court, the 
taxpayer bore the onus of explaining what his or her intention was at a particular time of 
action and in SIR v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd
257
 the court stated that ‘in an enquiry as to the 
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intention with which a transaction was entered into for the purpose of the law relating to 
income tax, a court of law is not concerned with that kind of subjective state of mind required 
for the purposes of the criminal law, but rather with the purpose for which the transaction was 
entered into.’258 
This therefore means that the court is concerned with what the taxpayer perceived in his mind 
when acting. This usually relates to the time in respect of which the taxpayer formed a 
business, acquired an asset or disposed an asset or decides to commit an illegal activity. The 
problem faced by the courts in applying the subjective test is in determining the true intention 
of the taxpayer.  This was explained by Snyman J in ITC 1071
259
 as follows:  
As a Court we were much impressed by the appellant and the manner in which he gave his 
evidence. We have formed the view that he is not only an honest witness but an honourable 
man who has approached the giving of his evidence on that footing and has tried to give his 
evidence as objectively as possible. We attach considerable weight to his statement of what 
his intention was, but we must, of course, bear in mind that even honest men can never quite 
free themselves of the influence of their personal interests, and it is necessary for us to test his 




One may assume that the court foresaw the danger of the taxpayer explaining what his/her 
intention was in order to elucidate evidence, thus displaying an intention which will 
determine the outcome of the case in his favour. This resulted in the courts adopting a more 
strict approach into determining the intention of the taxpayer, for example in ITC 1185
261
 the 
court stated that ‘the ipse dixit of the taxpayer as to his intent and purpose should not lightly 
be regarded as decisive.’262 However, it should be determined on an objective review of all 
the relevant facts and circumstances, such as ‘the conduct of the taxpayer in relation to the 
transaction in issue, the nature of his business and the frequency of his past participation in 
similar transactions.’263 From these factors the court will draw its own inferences and weigh 
and test it against the direct evidence of the taxpayer’s intention.264  
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The other factors which may be adopted in determining a receipt includes the nature of the 
asset in the taxpayer’s hands, the dominant intention of the taxpayer in cases where there is 




4.1.2 PRECEDENT ON THE TAXPAYER’S INTENTION WITH REFERNCE TO 
CASE LAW ON ILLEGAL INCOME.  
Since the question of determining the taxpayer’s intention was not firstly considered in MP 
Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS,
266
 an inquiry into the factors considered by the 
courts in determining the taxpayer’s intention with regard to illegal income will be 
considered. Since the question of determining the intention of the taxpayer was brought by 
the court, it had the responsibility to first determine how earlier decisions dealing with the 
taxation of illegal income had approached the question of determining the intention of the 
taxpayer and from that it would have been in a position to set out key factors which may 
assist in determining the intention of the taxpayer. 
In cases dealing with the taxation of illegal income, these factors were previously considered 
by the courts when determining the taxpayer’s intention in respect of a taxpayer who 
accumulates secret profits
267
 and where there is a unilateral taking by the taxpayer.
268
In 
determining a receipt in respect of  the taxpayer who accumulated a secret profit
269
 the court 
placed much weight on the intention of the principal because of the existence of an agent 
principal relationship, by concluding that although evidence clearly showed that the taxpayer 
had the necessary intention to personally benefit from fraudulently overcharging M (its 
principal), since the taxpayer was acting as an agent on behalf of the principal, the law of 
agency deems all transactions flowing and concluded through the agent to have been 
conducted and concluded by the principal, thus the taxpayer’s intention to benefit in respect 
of the transaction became useless. It is good to note that this factor (agent and principal 
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The High Court of Zimbabwe in COT v G
271
 considered the position of the taxpayer who 
unilaterally takes funds entrusted to it. The court reasoned that in order for stolen proceeds to 
constitute a receipt there has to be a match of intention between the giver of the amount and 
the receiver of the amount, in other words the giver should have the intention to give the 
amount to the receiver for personal benefit and the receiver should also have the intention to 
receive the amount given for personal benefit. This therefore means that in order to determine 
the intention of the taxpayer, the court has a duty to determine whether there was a match of 
intention.  
This would have meant the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP Finance Group CC (in 
liquidation) v C:SARS
272
 should have interpreted the intention of the taxpayer by 
investigating the presence of intention from both the investors and the taxpayer. In other 
words it means that it should have determined whether the investors intended to give the 
taxpayer the deposits for own use and benefit and that the taxpayer should share the same 
intention that the amounts from investors was for her own personal use and benefit (in other 
words the taxpayer should have no intention that her conduct amounts to theft). It is 
noteworthy that this case considered the position of a thief. 
If the Supreme Court of Appeal in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
273
 had 
considered the above mentioned tests for determining the intention of the taxpayer it should 
have considered whether or not there was an existing agent and principal relationship, that is 
whether or not the taxpayer was acting as an agent of the investors and the deposits which 
investors deposited into the account of the taxpayer were dealt with by the taxpayer as an 
agent acting on behalf of the investors. 
If the Supreme Court of Appeal would have answered this question in the affirmative it 
would have produced the result that the intention of the taxpayer which played an important 
role in MP Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
274
 would have had to be disregarded 
because whenever there is a nova causa interveniens such as the law of agency, which played 
a major role in the outcome of the case in ITC 1792,
275
the court disregards the intention of the 
taxpayer(agent) and determines the question of a receipt on the case based on the intention of 
the principal. 
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Based on the understanding of what the taxpayer’s intention implies and the factors which the 
court considers in applying this test when determining whether or not an amount is capital or 
revenue in nature. The consideration of such approach may assist in determining the factors 
which the court needs to apply in determining whether or not the taxpayer had the intention to 
personally benefit from pursuing illegal transactions. Such consideration may be beneficial 
when applied in cases other than where the taxpayer operates an illegal scheme.  
If the consideration of such factors are applied successfully in determining whether or not the 
taxpayer had the intention to personally benefit by engaging in illegal activities, such 
application may strengthen the correctness of the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in MP 
Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v C:SARS.
276
  
Since we have considered some of the ways in respect of which illegal income may be 
subjected to the taxpayer’s gross income for normal tax purposes in terms of the South 
African jurisprudence, it is necessary to determine the approach used by foreign courts in 
respect of subjecting illegal income to taxation. In Chapter 5 a consideration of the Australian 
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CHAPTER 5 TAXATION OF ILLEGAL INCOME IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW 
ZEALAND. 
5.1.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The desire for success is one of the things that people have in common, but the manner in 
which people seek to achieve it differs. As in South Africa, the use of illegal means to derive 
income is also a problem in Australia and New Zealand.  Once the perpetrator has been 
discovered, the gains realised from the illegal act attract the attention of the tax collector. In 
both these countries, the collector of revenue has wide arms to collect illegal income and 
include it in the taxpayer’s taxable income. 
 
5.1.2 THE JUSTIFICATION FOR TAXING ILLEGAL INCOME 
The ability of the taxing authority in each jurisdiction to tax illegal income stems from its 
taxation legislation. In Australia the Income Assessment Act
277
  defines income derived by 
the taxpayer as all proceeds derived from the carrying on of a business for the purpose of 
earning assessable income.
278
 Section 25A (1) of the Income Assessment Act
279
 goes further 
to state that assessable income includes all profits derived  from the carrying on or carrying 
out of any profit making undertaking or scheme
280
 and the Taxation Ruling
281
 issued by the 
Australian Tax Office explicitly provides that all proceeds derived by the taxpayer from 
systematically engaging in prohibited activities forms part of the taxpayer’s assessable 
income
282
 and provides that the test provided in section 25A (1) of the Income Assessment 
Act
283
 applies when determining whether or not illegal income should form part of the 
taxpayer’s assessable income.284 Section 25A (1) provides for the carrying on of a business 
test which is satisfied when the elements of a business such as repetition, regularity, aim of 
profit making and organisation are present. 
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In terms of this Taxing Ruling
285
 the concept underlying the taxation of illegal income stems 
from the British and American concept of taxing illegal income. This is seen by making 
reference to British cases on the taxation of illegal income such as Partridge v. 
Mallandaine
286
  where the court reasoned that that the Commissioner would be correct in 
assessing a taxpayer who derives a profit of £2000 per year, through carrying on a trade of 
systematically receiving and selling stolen goods. Such reasoning thus makes illegal income 
taxable and conforms with Lindsay v. IRC
287
 where the court held that the act of trafficking in 
drugs, although being illegal, resembles carrying on a trade of selling drugs under a permit 
and because the law permits the sale of certain drugs, the profits realized from illegally 
dealing in drugs can be taxable. In conclusion, the court pointed out that such an illustration 
indicates that the test to tax incidental illegal gains is to identify a similar or parallel legal 
business and if one is discovered then the activity is taxable.
288
 
In New Zealand, section BD1 (5) of the Income Tax Act
289
 defines assessable income as any 
income which forms part of the taxpayer’s gross income other than that which is exempt, 
excluded income and non-resident foreign income. Section CB 32 caters for a situation where 
the taxpayer is in possession of stolen property.
290
 In both Australia and New Zealand, the 
courts have, as will be seen below, used the carrying on of a business test to determine 
whether or not illegal proceeds in the hands of the taxpayer is taxable or not. In terms of the 
application of this test, the court investigates whether or not the taxpayer had the intention to 
make a profit and the nature of the business with respect to the frequency of activities, scope 
of the operation of the business, volume of the transaction undertaken, financial result 
achieved by the taxpayer and the effort of the taxpayer to name a few.
291
 
In Australia for example the application of the carrying on of a business test was successfully 
used by the court in the case of CIR v La Rosa
292
 where the taxpayer, a dealer in heroin, made 
a huge amount of money from dealing in drugs. After the illegal trade was discovered, the 
taxpayer was committed to prison for a period of 12 years.
293
 As a result of the imprisonment, 
the taxpayer’s illegal gains from dealing in drugs were disclosed and came to the attention of 
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the Commissioner who issued an assessment, taxing the taxpayer for all gains made for the 
previous 7 years. 
After receiving notice of the Commissioner’s intention, the taxpayer objected. In considering 
the issue of whether the profits derived by the taxpayer should form part of his assessable 
income, the court visited the ‘Taxation Ruling’294 which provided that ‘receipts from a 
systematic activity where the elements of a business are present are income, irrespective of 
whether they are legal or illegal and on the strength of it, held that the proceeds in the 
taxpayer’s hands satisfied the requirements of section 25 (1) of the Income Assessment Act295 
and as such should form part of the taxpayer’s assessable income. 
In terms of this decision what one can assume is that the court considered whether or not 
there was a legal business of dealing in drugs, which it found that there was and on the basis 
of this, the requirement provided in section 25 (1) of the Income Assessment Act
296
 was thus 
satisfied. This therefore means that since the taxability of illegal income is based on the 
wording of section 25 (1) of the Income Tax Assessment Act,
297
 the reading of the section 
indicates that an illegal transaction which is void ab intio will not be taxable. The basis for 
this will be the absence of a legally recognised business which has similar features to the 
illegal one. A good example of an analysis of the case law dealing with this aspect will be 
illustrated when considering the New Zealand treatment of illegal income. 
In New Zealand, the Income Tax Act,
298
 unlike the Income Tax Assessment Act,
299
 does not 
have a section where it provides that income should be derived from the carrying on of a 
business for the purpose of earning assessable income. Section CA 1 defines amounts that are 
income as income belonging to the taxpayer in terms of any of the provisions of the Act
300
 or 
if the amount within the ordinary meaning constitutes income
301
and section CB 32 caters for 
situations where there is no similar systematic business transaction permitted in law.
302
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However it is good to note that before section CB 32 was inserted into the Act
303
the position 
was that the court used the doctrine of claim of right test to determine whether or not illegal 
income derived by the taxpayer in cases where a systematic business transaction was absent, 
was taxable. This test was applied by the court in A Taxpayer v CIR.
304
 where the taxpayer, 
an accountant, systematically embezzled over 2 million US Dollars from its employer, which 
money was invested in the futures market. Due to the risk attached to these kinds of 
investments, the taxpayer was unfortunate and lost all the money invested. After the 
discovery of the embezzlement, the taxpayer repaid half of the amount embezzled. As a result 
of this the Commissioner assessed him for the funds embezzled and on income from his 
trading activities. The taxpayer objected to the assessment. 
Relying on the ‘constructive trust doctrine’305 the taxpayer argued that the embezzled funds 
in its hands were conditional, similar to a loan, and the taxpayer had an obligation to repay 
the stolen amount back to the owner. In response, the Commissioner, relying on Canadian 
and American cases, argued that the nature of stolen funds in the hands of the taxpayer is not 
affected by an obligation to repay the money or the constructive trust doctrine. 
In deciding upon the issue the court relied on the Canadian and American decisions which 
provided for the doctrine of a claim of right which ignores any restitution of the stolen 
property and taxes the thief on the gain derived from theft. Morris J held stated that:  
The respondent (taxpayer) was under an obligation to return the stolen money. For the money 
returned no question of taxation arose, while the remaining money he converted to his own 
use. While he is still liable in law to account for the monies, he is taxable on them because he 
was in effect holding and using the money for his own account. He is obliged to return the 
money because of the manner in which he acquired it. He is taxable on the money because of 
the manner in which he held it. His duty to return the money is a separate issue to the question 
of taxation. While he is not the strict legal owner of the money he is holding it for his own 
use. The reality of the situation is that the respondent regarded the money as his own to use 
for his purposes as he chose. I therefore, conclude that the stolen monies do constitute income 
and are assessable for income tax.
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However, on appeal, the court of Appeal strongly rejected reliance on Canadian and 
American cases and adopted the Australian approach of Murray (NSW) Pty Ltd v C of T
307
 
and stated that:  
The Court obviously considered that sums received subject to a trust or charge did not have 
the quality of income derived by the recipient. In principle, an embezzler is liable to return or 
repay the stolen property and the innocent party to embezzlement retains the right to trace the 
property or its proceeds into the hands of the embezzler. The embezzler does not have any 
claim of right to the stolen property. In the absence of a specific statutory provision allowing 
for a re-characterisation or different characterisation of the misappropriation receipt for tax 
purposes, the ordinary rules apply. Legal rights and obligations cannot be ignored. There is no 
gain to a taxpayer unless the receipt is derived beneficially by the taxpayer. Taxation by 




5.2 A COMPERATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA’S APPROACH 
AND THE AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND APPROACH. 
As has been enumerated above, it is clear that in both Australia and New Zealand, illegal 
income in the hands of the taxpayer is taxable. The starting point with regard to subjecting 
illegal income to taxation lies with the Taxing Ruling
309
 and the legislation which caters for 
the approach in respect of which the courts should go about in subjecting illegal income to 
taxation. With regard to the Australian approach evidence shows that the court applies the 
parallel business test to determine whether or not illegal income in the hands of the taxpayer 
is taxable.  If the illegal activity committed by the taxpayer satisfies the parallel business test, 
the proceeds derived from such illegal act will form part of the taxpayer’s assessable income. 
By looking at this approach, one my assume that the taxpayer in MP Finance
310
 would have 
been taxed on the application of this test, while on the other hand it would also indicate that 
the taxpayer who performs a unilateral taking such as theft would escape liability from 
taxation on the basis of the absence of a parallel business (agreeing with COT v G)
.311
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The issuing of a taxation binding ruling by SARS similar to the Taxation Ruling
312
 would not 
help in solving the problem in South Africa. The reason for this is because all that it does is to 
state that illegal income in Australia is taxable and provides that the test to apply is the one 
provided under section 25 (1) of the Act.
313
 
The reason for this is, firstly, if SARS were to issue a taxing binding ruling the applicable test 
would not be in terms of the gross income definition.
314
 This would be because of the absence 
of the definition of key phrases in that definition.  Secondly, the problem in South Africa is 
not whether illegal income is taxable or not, but the application of the correct test which 
determines the levying of tax on illegal income, the presence of the phrase ‘illegal income is 
taxable’ in the taxation binding ruling would not assist in solving the problem and thirdly it 
would mean that if it had to do so it would refer to a test applied by the courts as the 
applicable test to follow which at present is the one applied by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v CSARS.
315
  
Now turning to the New Zealand approach, which makes illegal income taxable on the basis 
that the taxpayer has derived a gain from the illegal act: its application to determining a 
receipt in our gross income definition
316
may be helpful because it will adhere to the meaning 
provided by the court in Geldenhuys v CIR.
317
 This is because one may assume that there 
cannot be a receipt without a benefit, so if this application was applied to all cases dealing 
with the taxation of illegal income it would not be difficult for the courts to determine 
whether or not the proceeds derived by the taxpayer are taxable or not. 
Furthermore in New Zealand the court has identified the need to tax proceeds derived from 
theft in situations where the taxpayer received the property without a claim of right.
318
 If the 
legislature could adopt such a provision into our South African Income Tax Act
319
 it would 
make proceeds derived from theft taxable and be included into the taxpayer’s gross income. 
By doing this the Commissioner would be widening the scope of taxing all form of illegally 
derived income. 
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On the strength of the analysis, my recommendation is that South Africa should adopt the 
New Zealand approach which is designed to make the Commissioner run on a fat belly and as 
such will result in the collecting of more money than if it were to apply the Australian 
approach which is limited and does not cater for situations where the taxpayer’s illegal 
conduct cannot be equated to a legally recognised business.  
5.3 CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATIONS  
From the application of the phrase ‘received by’ to illegal income, the result produced is that 
the problem of subjecting illegal income to taxation is not created by the illegality underlying 
the transaction, but difficulty arises as to the applicable test which the court has to adopt for a 
specific case. This is caused by the different means in respect of which the taxpayer obtained 
illegal income which is the subject matter of taxation. This then results in inconsistencies in 
the applicable test. Even though the question of determining a receipt in respect of illegal 
income has finally reached the Supreme Court of Appeal, the application of the subjective 
method of interpretation to determine whether or not the taxpayer had the intention to benefit 
from an illegal transaction, is inadequate where the taxpayer is acting in a representative 
capacity
320
 and where there is a unilateral taking such as theft.
321
  
Furthermore since the Supreme Court of Appeal was silent in indicating the factors it 
considered in order to come to the conclusion that the taxpayer had the requisite intention to 
receive the amount in question for gross income purposes, one may assume that such test may 
prove to be difficult in cases where the facts of the case are different from those in MP 
Finance Group CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS.
322
 Recommendations are that the courts should 
in future apply the test of intention used when determining whether an amount is capital or 
revenue in nature in order to determine whether or not illegal income in the hands of the 
taxpayer constitutes a receipt. 
Another way of determining whether illegal income in the hands of the taxpayer constitutes a 
receipt or not is by importing the New Zealand method and inserting into our Income Tax 
Act
323
 a section which will provide an alternative test in cases where the MP Finance Group 
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CC (in liquidation) v C:SARS
 324
 decision is inadequate in subjecting illegal income in the 
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